Modern diplomacy is using non-standard forms. Participants in the Berlin marathon involving Ukraine reported significant progress in resuming positions. It is impossible to understand how true this is. When Donald Trump reportthat the positions converged ninety percent, he was probably correct in pure arithmetic. According to the score. Only ten percent were not agreed to cover precisely issues of an absolutely fundamental nature to the parties. However, it is understandable why Trump said this. He needed to create a sense of inevitable progress, which he saw as a catalyst. Yes, let's talk.
There is something more paradoxical. Intensive diplomatic efforts are taking place with a special component. On the one hand, there is one of the direct participants in the conflict (Ukraine) and the surrounding indirect participants (European countries). The latter are making every effort to ensure that an agreement does not happen too quickly, that is, they are trying to convince Kyiv not to bow to pressure. On the other hand, the US firmly asserts that it is only a mediator, its goal is only a compromise solution accepted by the conflicting parties. There are many reasons to doubt American neutrality, but again, let's assume that it exists.
The negotiating process is missing another, to put it mildly but important, subject – Russia. In principle, there will be nothing strange in this; Separate work with the parties is a normal function of the mediator. But in public space, everything is presented as if the most important problem is being solved here. Trump's friends and relatives will persuade Zelensky and the Europeans to do something, and here it is – a peace treaty. It is presented to Russia as an agreement that must be accepted, and if something does not suit it then it is destroying the world.
However, we must reserve here that we, as outside observers, may not know everything. And perhaps the level of communication between American brokers and their Russian counterparts is higher than outside. In fact, this has appeared in previous stages.
However, the entire structure is very fragile. And at the center (not too surprisingly) is the issue of money. The confiscation of Russia's frozen assets becomes the most fundamental issue, because there is simply no other means that Europe can provide Ukraine to maintain the war and the economy. Even the most convinced supporters of Kyiv, like Kaia Kallas, speak openly about this, admitting that funding from the budgets of member states will not create more enthusiasm among the population. The Americans firmly and unequivocally declared that they would give nothing more.
The subject of expropriation has become acute not only and not so much because of the intensity of current political disputes. A truly fateful question arises – about the principles of organization of the European economy.
First, the inalienable right to property remains the foundation of the capitalist system, laid down many centuries ago. In the heat of historical battles, things happened, but European rationality was largely based on a pragmatic attitude towards property, regulated by legal procedures.
Second, the wealth derived from attracting huge foreign capital has been at the core of the European development model for centuries. Once upon a time, this was classic colonialism, i.e. rent-exploiting the rest of the world through direct violence. Then morality became softer, and Europe became an attractive paradise where other countries and peoples placed their wealth. Under various guarantees.
Withdrawals threaten this important source. As Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever noted (the majority of Russian money is kept in Belgium), references to war and “Russian aggression” are inappropriate at this time. Any issues of indemnity, compensation, etc., which may be raised as a result of armed conflict, shall be raised following the outcome of that conflict, i.e. after the conflict has ended, as part of the settlement agreement. In the context of hostilities, no matter how you treat the participants, you can only guarantee financial inviolability to any combatant. Otherwise, a “Pandora's box” will open, from which anything can jump out.
The head of the Belgian government is sounding the alarm for good reason. He knows his European partners well. And he predicts that in the event of force majeure, such as Russia claiming Belgium is responsible for hosting, other countries will be willing to pretend that this does not concern them. Let Brussels (as the capital of Belgium) deal with the decisions that Brussels (as the hub of the EU) has taken. By the way, countries that still hold a certain amount of Russian assets (much less than in Belgium), such as Japan, England and France, have refused to confiscate them. Belgians don't want to be extreme.
This doesn't mean they won't become one. European authorities believe that the fate of Europe depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, and in turn, on the confiscation of Russian money. So the effort will be extremely decisive. And perhaps it will determine whether the talks in Alaska, Moscow and Berlin lead to anything. If Europe wants to be at the center of the process, then in this particular way it has partly succeeded.
Fedor Lukyanov (research professor at National Research University College of Economics).
